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Bousso: Iran's 'tollbooth' at Hormuz will hard-wire higher energy costs

For now, the war that shut down the Strait of Hormuz is over. Tehran's insistence on acting as the toll booth keeper for the world's critical?oil artery could make energy markets more vulnerable and lead to higher prices. According to U.S. president Donald Trump, the U.S., Iran and Pakistan agreed to a ceasefire on Tuesday, which was mediated by Pakistan. Tehran must halt its blockade against oil and gas through the Strait. According to an Iranian official, the waterway through which a fifth or more of the world's gas and oil flowed prior to the U.S./Israeli war against Iran, it could reopen by Friday, but in a?limited?fashion, under Iranian control. Tehran also said on Tuesday that it would charge ships passing through the strait a fee under a permanent deal. The strait is only 34 km wide (21 miles) at its narrowest part between Iran and Oman.

Some media reports suggest that Oman is strongly opposing any such toll system under the existing agreements. Others claim that a similar toll system already exists.

In an interview with ABC News, Trump stated that the U.S. also considered setting up a joint-venture to charge ships tolls to access Hormuz. It is unclear how such a plan would work in reality. Iran could have the upper hand. The conflict has shown?Tehran’s ability to use drones, sea mines and missiles to attack dozens of vessels - giving it powerful leverage without a formal ban.

A toll system in Iran would violate one of the most fundamental principles of international law, freedom of navigation. Under this principle, ships may navigate international waters free of interference by coastal states. The United States has always positioned itself as a global guarantor, enforcing that principle through diplomatic pressure and naval patrols.

Washington would be forced to make a major strategic shift if it allowed Iran to control the Hormuz Strait. This would also represent a shock to the Middle East's oil and gas industry, which is the lifeblood of many countries, including Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, and Qatar.

This would create a layer of permanent political risk, both for Gulf producers and customers. Tehran would have disproportionate control over which ships could transit at what time. Iran could, for instance, outright ban Israeli-owned vessels, slow Saudi shipments in order to exert pressure on Riyadh or use delays as a leverage in unrelated disputes.

They would not want Tehran to have such a strong grip on their main trade route. The implications for Asian buyers would be serious. China, Japan South Korea and India are heavily dependent on Gulf supply. Even modest and unpredictable disruptions could have a significant impact on refining margins and spot prices for liquefied gas and inflation expectations.

It is unclear how much damage will be caused by the transit of vessels from Iran to friendly nations like China, India, Iraq, and Pakistan.

HIGHER COSTS

The toll could be significant financially. According to reports, the toll could cost as much as $2 million for each transit. This is roughly equivalent to the total cost to charter a large crude carrier to travel from the Middle East all the way to China in 2025.

In addition to the death toll, increased security risks will increase insurance premiums for LNG carriers and tankers entering the Gulf. This will further drive up transportation costs. The war-risk premiums, which were volatile even before the conflict, will likely continue to be a structural feature of the market.

Some ships could try to follow the coastline of Oman while transiting Hormuz. This would reduce the overall traffic volume and still expose ships to Iranian missiles, drones, and fast-attack craft.

ALTERNATIVE ROUTES OF EXPORT These risks, combined with the uncertainty surrounding relations with Iran, will likely lead Saudi Arabia and UAE to continue using alternative oil export routes that were used during the war for many months, if they are not years.

Saudi Aramco, the state oil giant, began pumping large quantities of crude through its East West pipeline to the Red Sea Port of Yanbu soon after the outbreak of war on February 28. This was done in accordance with contingency plans that were developed specifically for such a situation.

The pipeline can transport 7 million barrels a day. Of this, 5 million barrels a day are exported, and the remainder is used to feed domestic refineries. According to Kpler, Saudi Arabia exported an average of 3.3 million barrels per day from its west coast ports in March. This is nearly half of the volume it will export by 2025. Even these alternatives have proven to be vulnerable. An industry source said that the East-West pipeline had been hit by an Iranian attack just hours after ceasefire announcement. Flows were expected to be affected.

The UAE also diverted additional volumes via its pipeline to Fujairah's oil terminal outside of the Gulf. Kpler reports that exports from Fujairah increased to 1.6m bpd from averaging 1.1m bpd since 2025. These routes are essential for producers and buyers to hedge against the Hormuz threat, but they do not offer a full solution due to their limited capacity and vulnerability to regional tensions. The mere possibility of Iranian oversight is already changing risk perceptions, even if the full toll system never materializes. Iranian control of the Strait would give Tehran disproportionate power in the region's economic lifeline. Saudi Arabia and allies will resist this, whether diplomatically or not. Although the ceasefire is holding, for Gulf oil exporters and their allies, the battle for Hormuz has just begun. Ron Bousso is a columnist at.

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(source: Reuters)